Harden authentication, tenant isolation and security boundaries

This commit is contained in:
t.indorf
2026-10-09 22:49:55 +02:00
parent ec3f4f933d
commit 656ada80bd
71 changed files with 3107 additions and 1200 deletions
+45 -42
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import NextAuth from "next-auth";
import Credentials from "next-auth/providers/credentials";
import { compare } from "bcryptjs";
import { limitPublicAction } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
import { z } from "zod";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma";
@@ -14,12 +15,12 @@ import { prisma } from "@/lib/prisma";
// =====================================================================
const credentialsSchema = z.object({
email: z.string().email().toLowerCase().trim(),
password: z.string().min(1),
email: z.string().trim().max(254).email().toLowerCase(),
password: z.string().min(1).refine(value => Buffer.byteLength(value, "utf8") <= 72),
});
// Brute-Force-Schutz auf Account-Ebene (planung.md §5.5).
// Globales Rate-Limiting ergänzen wir später per Middleware.
// Zusätzlich greifen atomare, instanzübergreifende DB-Limits vor bcrypt.
const MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 10;
const LOCKOUT_MINUTES = 15;
@@ -40,8 +41,14 @@ export const { handlers, auth, signIn, signOut } = NextAuth({
if (!parsed.success) return null;
const { email, password } = parsed.data;
if (!(await limitPublicAction("login", email, 20, 900))) return null;
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email } });
if (!user) return null;
if (!user) {
// Match the cost for nonexistent accounts without exposing account existence.
await compare(password, "$2b$12$KbQiLuL6QbybTw/WNx4Ige2yCZcjVccoruuDx3vmkJt8YYUpphdIu");
return null;
}
if (user.disabledAt || !user.emailVerifiedAt) return null;
// Account temporär gesperrt → Login pauschal ablehnen.
if (user.lockedUntil && user.lockedUntil > new Date()) {
@@ -50,23 +57,18 @@ export const { handlers, auth, signIn, signOut } = NextAuth({
const passwordOk = await compare(password, user.passwordHash);
if (!passwordOk) {
const nextAttempts = user.failedLoginAttempts + 1;
await prisma.user.update({
where: { id: user.id },
data: {
failedLoginAttempts: nextAttempts,
lockedUntil:
nextAttempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS
? new Date(Date.now() + LOCKOUT_MINUTES * 60_000)
: user.lockedUntil,
},
});
await prisma.$executeRaw`
UPDATE users SET "failedLoginAttempts" = "failedLoginAttempts" + 1,
"lockedUntil" = CASE WHEN "failedLoginAttempts" + 1 >= ${MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS}
THEN NOW() + make_interval(mins => ${LOCKOUT_MINUTES}::int) ELSE "lockedUntil" END
WHERE id = ${user.id}`;
return null;
}
// Erfolgreicher Login → Counter zurücksetzen, lastLogin aktualisieren.
await prisma.user.update({
where: { id: user.id },
const admitted = await prisma.user.updateMany({
where: { id: user.id, disabledAt: null, sessionVersion: user.sessionVersion, passwordHash: user.passwordHash, emailVerifiedAt: { not: null },
OR: [{ lockedUntil: null }, { lockedUntil: { lte: new Date() } }] },
data: {
failedLoginAttempts: 0,
lockedUntil: null,
@@ -74,7 +76,10 @@ export const { handlers, auth, signIn, signOut } = NextAuth({
},
});
if (admitted.count !== 1) return null;
return {
sessionVersion: user.sessionVersion,
authenticatedAt: Date.now(),
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
name: `${user.firstName} ${user.lastName}`.trim(),
@@ -86,6 +91,13 @@ export const { handlers, auth, signIn, signOut } = NextAuth({
}),
],
callbacks: {
async redirect({ url, baseUrl }) {
if (/[\\\x00-\x20]/.test(url)) return baseUrl;
try {
const destination = new URL(url, baseUrl);
return destination.origin === new URL(baseUrl).origin ? destination.href : baseUrl;
} catch { return baseUrl; }
},
/**
* Wird beim Login (mit `user`) und bei jedem Token-Refresh (ohne `user`)
* aufgerufen. Beim Login schreiben wir die mandantenrelevanten Felder
@@ -96,31 +108,20 @@ export const { handlers, auth, signIn, signOut } = NextAuth({
async jwt({ token, user }) {
if (user) {
token.id = user.id;
token.role = user.role;
token.kitaId = user.kitaId;
token.familyId = user.familyId;
return token;
token.sessionVersion = user.sessionVersion;
token.authenticatedAt = user.authenticatedAt;
}
const tokenUserId = token.id ?? token.sub;
if (tokenUserId) {
const fresh = await prisma.user.findUnique({
where: { id: tokenUserId },
select: { role: true, kitaId: true, familyId: true },
});
if (!fresh) {
// User wurde gelöscht → Token entwerten.
// (Auth.js erkennt den fehlenden `sub`/`id` und meldet ab.)
delete (token as Partial<typeof token>).id;
delete (token as Partial<typeof token>).sub;
return token;
}
token.id = tokenUserId;
token.role = fresh.role;
token.kitaId = fresh.kitaId;
token.familyId = fresh.familyId;
}
const id = token.id ?? token.sub;
if (typeof id !== "string" || !id || id.length > 64 || !Number.isSafeInteger(token.sessionVersion) || !Number.isFinite(token.authenticatedAt) || token.authenticatedAt > Date.now() + 60_000) return null;
const fresh = await prisma.user.findUnique({
where: { id },
select: { role: true, kitaId: true, familyId: true, disabledAt: true, sessionVersion: true, emailVerifiedAt: true },
});
if (!fresh || fresh.disabledAt || !fresh.emailVerifiedAt || fresh.sessionVersion !== token.sessionVersion) return null;
token.id = id;
token.role = fresh.role;
token.kitaId = fresh.kitaId;
token.familyId = fresh.familyId;
return token;
},
@@ -131,7 +132,9 @@ export const { handlers, auth, signIn, signOut } = NextAuth({
*/
async session({ session, token }) {
if (token && session.user) {
session.user.id = token.id ?? token.sub;
session.user.id = token.id;
session.user.sessionVersion = token.sessionVersion;
session.user.authenticatedAt = token.authenticatedAt;
session.user.role = token.role;
session.user.kitaId = token.kitaId;
session.user.familyId = token.familyId;